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We propose a model of a learning agent whose interaction with the environment is governed by a
simulation-basedprojection,whichallowstheagenttoprojectitselfintofuturesituationsbeforeittakesreal
action. Projective simulation is based on a random walk through a network of clips, which are elementary
patches of episodic memory. The network of clips changes dynamically, both due to new perceptual input
and due to certain compositional principles of the simulation process. During simulation, the clips are
screened for specific features which trigger factual action of the agent. The scheme is different from other,
computational, notions of simulation, and it provides a new element in an embodied cognitive science
approach to intelligent action and learning. Our model provides a natural route for generalization to
quantum-mechanical operation and connects the fields of reinforcement learning and quantum
computation.
C
omputers of various sorts play a role in many processes of modern society. A prominent example is the
personalcomputer whichhasaspecific userinterface, waitingforhumaninput anddelivering outputin a
prescribedformat.Computersalsofeatureinautomatedprocesses,forexampleintheproductionlinesofa
modernfactory.Heretheinput/outputinterfaceisusuallywithothermachinery,suchasarobotenvironmentina
car factory.
An increasingly important role is played by so-called intelligent agents that operate autonomously in more
complex and changing environments. Examples of such environments are traffic, remote space, but also the
internet. The design of intelligent agents, specifically for tasks such as learning
1, has become a unifying agenda of
various branches of artificial intelligence
2. Intelligence is hereby defined as the capability of the agent to perceive
and act on its environment in a way that maximizes its chances of success. In recent years, the field of embodied
cognitive sciences
3 has provided a new conceptual and empirical framework for the study of intelligence, both in
biological and in artificial entities.
A particular manifestation of intelligence is creativity and it is therefore natural to ask: To what extent can
agents or robots show creative behavior? Creativity is hereby understood as a distinguished capability of dealing
with unprecedented situations and of relating a given situation with other conceivable situations. A similar
question may arise in behavioral studies with animals, and it is related, on a more fundamental level, to the
problem of free will
4.
In this paper, we introduce a scheme of information processing for intelligent agents which allows for an
element of creative behavior in the above sense. Its central feature is a projection simulator (PS) which allows the
agent,basedonprevious experience–and variationsthereof– toprojectitselfintopotentialfuturesituations. The
PSusesaspecificmemorysystem,whichwecallepisodic&compositionalmemory(ECM)andwhichprovidesthe
platform for simulating future action before real action is taken. The ECM can be described as a stochastic
network ofso-called clips,whichconstitute theelementary excitations ofepisodic memory. Projectivesimulation
consistsofareplayofclipsrepresentingpreviousexperience,togetherwiththecreationofnewclipsundercertain
variationalandcompositionalprinciples.Thesimulationrequiresaplatformwhichisdetachedfromdirectmotor
action andon which fictitious actionis continuously ‘‘tested’’. Learning takes place byacontinuous modification
of the network of clips, which occurs in three distinct ways: (1) adaptive changes of transition probabilities
betweenexistingclips(bayesianupdating);(2)creationofnewclipsinthenetworkvianewperceptualinput(new
clips fromnew percepts);(3)creation ofnewclipsfromexisting onesundercertain compositionalprinciples (new
clips through composition).
In modern physics, the notion of simulation and the ultimate power of physical systems to simulate other
systems has become one of the central topics in the field of quantum information and computation
5. A timely
example is the universal quantum simulator, which is capable of mimicking the time evolution of any other
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other examples are classical stochastic simulators that mimic the
time-evolution of some complex process such as the weather or the
climate. These are all examples of dynamic simulators, which simu-
late (that is, compute) the time evolution of a system according to
some specified law. It is important to note that these notions of
simulators build on prescribed law, e.g. certain equations of motion
provided by physical, biological, or ecological theory.
The projection simulator that we discuss in this paper – both its
classicalanditsquantumversion–isentirelydifferentandshouldbe
distinguished from these notions of simulators. As in standard the-
ory of reinforcement learning
1, our notion of projective simulation
builds entirely on experience (i.e. previously encountered perceptual
input together with the actions of the agent). Projective simulation
can be seen, in general terms, as a continuous feedback scheme of a
system (agent) endowed with some memory, interacting with its
environment.ThefunctionofPSistore-excitefragmentsofprevious
experience (clips) to simulate future action, before real action is
taken. As part of the simulation process, sequences of fictitious
memory will be created by a probabilistic excitation process. The
contents of these fictitious sequences are evaluated and screened
for specific features, leading to specific action. The episodic and
compositional memory thereby provides a reflection and simulation
platform which allows the agent to detach from primary experience
and to project itself into conceivable situations.
There is a body of literature in the fields of artificial intelligence
and machine learning, where ideas of learning and simulation have
been discussed in various contexts (for modern textbook introduc-
tions, see e.g.
1–3,6). The specific notion of episodic memory and its
role for planning and prediction has been discussed in psychology in
the 1970s
7,8 and has since been attracting attention in various fields
including cognitive neuroscience and brain research, reinforcement
learning, and even robotics
11–19,23–28. The model which we develop
here differs however from previous work in essential respects, as will
be elaborated on below.
Ourmodelaimsatestablishingageneralframeworkthatconnects
the embodied agent research with fundamental notions of physics.
This requires a notion of simulation in agents that is both physically
grounded and sufficiently general in its constitutive concepts. We
claim that the abstract notion of clips and of projective simulation as
a random walk through the space of clips provides such a general
framework, which allows for different concrete realizations and
implementations. This framework also allows us to generalize the
model to quantum simulation, thereby connecting the problem of
artificialagentdesigntofundamentalconceptsinquantuminforma-
tion and computation.
The plan of the article is as follows. In the next chapter, we first
briefly review the standard definition of artificial agents. We then
introduce and describe in more detail the projection simulator and
our scheme of a learning agent based on episodic & compositional
memory. After setting the mathematical framework, we provide
illustrations of the main concepts using examples of a learning agent
inasimplecomputergame.Wealsocompareourmodelofprojective
simulation with some related work in the fields of artificial intel-
ligence, reinforcement learning, and the cognitive sciences. Finally,
we generalize the notion of the projection simulator to a quantum
mechanical scheme and discuss the potential role of quantum
information processing for artificial agent design.
Results
Intelligent agents. In the following, we shall discuss the concept of
projective simulation in the framework of intelligent agents
2.
Realizations of intelligent agents could be robots, biological
systems, or software packages (internet robots). An agent (see
Figure 1) has sensors, through which it perceives its environment,
and actuators, through which it acts upon the environment.
Internally, one may imagine that it has access to some kind of
computing device, on which the agent program is implemented.
The function of the agent program is to process the perceptual
input and output the result to the actuators.
For a deterministic agent, a given percept history completely
determines the next step (actuator motion) of the agent. For a stoch-
astic agent, it only determines the probabilities with which the agent
will perform the possible next actuator moves. In the present paper,
we shall deal with the latter situation.
The heart of the agent is usually considered to be itsprogram. The
programwilldependonthe natureof the agentand itsenvironment.
Itwillbedifferentforrobotsthatoperateincitytraffic,onthesurface
of a planet, or inside a human body. The environment usually has its
own rules that need to be taken into account when designing the
program: it is governed by the laws of physics or biology, and it may
have limited accessibility, observability, and predictability. The role
of the program is to deal with environmental data (through its sen-
sors) and let the agent respond to them in a rational way
2.
From a computer-science oriented perspective, it might seem as if
the problem of intelligent agents were a mere software problem, i.e.
reducible to algorithmic design. From such point of view, the ‘‘intel-
ligence’’ of the agent is imported and its capability to react rationally
within its environment depends entirely on the designer’s ingenuity
to anticipate all potential situations that the agent may encounter,
and thus to build corresponding rules into the program. However,
more recent developments in the area of embodied cognitive science
3
have emphasized physical aspects of the emergence of intelligence,
among them the fact that most biological or robotic agents are
‘‘embodied’’ and ‘‘situated’’, meaning that they acquire information
abouttheirenvironment–andtherebydevelopintelligentbehavior–
exclusively through physical interactions (via sensors) with the
environment.
In this paper, we will adopt such an embodied approach to under-
standing intelligence
3. We shall concentrate on a specific aspect of
intelligence and investigate the possibility of creative behavior in
robots or agents. In the spirit of the celebrated work of Braitenberg
and his vehicles
30, we will propose an explicit model of memory,
which, together with the idea of projective simulation, can give rise
to a well-defined notion of creative behavior. The description of
episodic memory, as a dynamic network of clips which grows as
the agent interacts with the world, is thereby fully embedded in the
agent architecture.
Learning based on projective simulation. In this section, we shall
focus on one crucial element of the agent architecture, which is its
memory, indicated by the two connected white boxes in Figure 1.
There are various and different aspects of memory, which enter in
the discussion and which should be kept apart. Research in behavioral
neuroscience
31 has shown that learning can be related to structural
changes on the molecular level of a neural network, providing
examples of Hebbian learning
32. The behavior of simple animals
(such as the sea slug Aplysia
32) can largely be described by a
Figure 1 | Model of an agent. Adapted and modified from
2 (see text).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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time. In the language of artificial agentresearch, this could be modeled
as a reflex agent, whose program is modified over time (which
represents the learning of the animal). In such type of learning, we
have a separation of time scales into ‘‘learning’’ (shaping of circuit)
versus ‘‘reflex’’ (execution of circuit) which is possible only for simple
agents, but it cannot explain more complex patterns of behavior.
Phenomenologically speaking, more complex behavior seems to
arise when an agent is able to ‘‘think for a while’’ before it ‘‘decides
what to do next.’’ This means the agent somehow evaluates a given
situation in the light of previous experience, whereby the type of
evaluation is different from the execution of a simple reflex circuit.
An essential step towards such more complex behavior seems to be
the capability of reinvoking memory without inducing immediate
motor action, which requires a separate level of representation and
storage of previous experience. Such type of memory must thus be
decoupled from immediate motor action and cannot, per definition,
be part of a reflex circuit.
Tomodelintelligentbehavior,peoplehavestudiedartificialagents
of various sorts (utility-based, goal-oriented, logic-based, plan-
ning,…)
2 whose actions are the result of some program or set of
rules. In so-called learning agents, the emphasis lies on modeling
the emergence of behavior patterns when there are no specific rules
a priori specified, except that the agent remembers in one way or the
other that certain percept-action pairs were rewarded or punished
(reinforcement learning).
Here we introduce a learning-type agent, whose decisions – i.e.
‘‘what to do next’’ in a given situation – depend not only on its
previous experience with similar situations, but also on fictitious
experiencewhichitisabletogenerateonitsown.Thecentralelement
is a projection simulator (PS), together with a type of episodic mem-
ory system (ECM), which helps the agent to project itself into ‘‘con-
ceivable’’ situations. Triggered by perceptual input, the PS calls
memory and induces a random walk through episodic memory
space. This random walk is primarily a replay of past experience
associated with the perceptual input, which is evaluated before it
leads to concrete action. However, memory itself is changed dynam-
ically,bothduetoactualexperienceandduetocertaincompositional
principles of memory recall, which may create new content corres-
ponding to fictitious experience that never really happened. In this
model, it is essential to have a representation of the environment in
terms of the episodic memory, which enables the agent to decouple
from immediate connection with the environment and reflect upon
its future actions. Importantly, this reflection is not realized as a
sophisticated computational process, but it can be seen as a struc-
tural-dynamical feature of memory itself.
As a physical basis of the PS, one can imagine a neural-network-
type structure, where any primary experience is accompanied by a
certain spatiotemporal excitation pattern of the network. The details
of this architecture, including the way of encoding information, the
concise learning rules, etc., are not important. The only relevant
feature is that a later re-excitation with a similar pattern, due to
whatever cause, will invoke similar experience. As the agent learns,
itwillrelatenew input withexistingmemoryand therebychangethe
structure of the network. The only relevant aspect of the neural-
network idea is, for our purposes, that any recall of memory is
understoodasadynamicre-playofanexcitationpattern,whichgives
rise to episodic sequences of memory.
Byepisodeswemeanpatchesofstoredprevious experience.Inthe
specificcontextofvision,onecouldalsocallita‘‘moviefragment’’or
‘‘clip’’. In the following, we will use the terms episode and clip inter-
changeably. Clips represent basic (but variable) units of memory
which will be accessed, manipulated, and created by the agent.
Clips themselves may be composed of more basic elements of
cognition such as color, shape, or motion, but they represent the
functional units in our theory of memory-driven behavior.
Formally, episodic memory will be described as a probabilistic
network of clips as illustrated in Figure 2. An excited clip calls, with
certainprobabilities,another,neighboringclip.Theneighborhoodof
clips is defined by the network structure, and the jump probabilities
will be functions of the percept history. In the simplest version, only
thejumpprobabilities(weights)changewithtime,whilethenetwork
structure (graph topology) and the clip content is static. In a refined
model,newclips(nodesinthegraph)maybeadded,andthecontent
of the clip may be modified (internal dimension of the nodes). A call
of the episodic memory triggers a random walk through this memory
space (network). In this sense, the agent jumps through the space of
clips, invoking patchwork-like sequences of virtual experience. Action
isinduced byscreening the clipsfor specific features. Whenacertain
feature (or combination of features) is present and above a certain
intensity level, it will trigger motor action.
In the following sections, we shall put some of these notions in a
more formal framework, and illustrate the idea of projective simu-
lation with concrete examples. These examples should be under-
stood as illustrations of the underlying notions and principles. We
discuss them in the context of simple problems of reinforcement
learning, but the notion of projective simulation is more general and
can be seen as a principle and building block for complete agent
architectures.
Mathematical modeling and notation. In physical terms, the
behavior of an agent (see Figure 1) can be described as a stochastic
process that maps input variables (percepts) to output variables
(actions). An external view of the agent consists in specifying, at
each time t, the conditional probability P
(t)(ajs) for action agA,
given that percept sgS was encountered. This is also called the
agent’s policy in the theory of reinforcement learning
1. Here, S and
A denote the set of possible percepts and actuator moves,
respectively, which we are going to describe in more detail shortly.
The dependence of this probability distribution on time t indi-
cates, for any non-trivial agent, the existence of memory. Usually,
one assumes that the agent operates in cycles, in which case t is an
integer variable. When writing P
(t)(ajs), one then refers to the
conditional probability for choosing action a 5 a
(t) at the end of
cycle t, if it was presented with s 5 s
(t) at the beginning of the
same cycle. In general, the probability with which the agent
chooses action a
(t) may depend on its entire previous history, i.e.
the percepts and actions s
(t21), a
(t21),…s
(1), a
(1) in all earlier cycles
of the agent’s life. However, the interesting part of the agent is
how it learns, i.e. how its history changes its internal state,w h i c h
in turn determines its future policy. A corresponding internal
description connects P
(t)(ajs) with the memory of the agent and
explains how memory is built up under a given history of percepts
and actions.
In our model of the agent, memory consists of a network of
episodes (or clips), which are sequences of ‘remembered’ percepts
and actions. The operation cycle of an agent can be described
as follows: (i) Encounter of percept sgS which happens with a cer-
tain probability P
(t)(s). The encounter of percept sgS triggers the
Figure 2 | Model of episodic memory as a network of clips.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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probability function I(cjs). (ii) Random walk through memory/clip
space C, which is described by conditional probabilities p
(t)(c9jc)o f
calling/exciting clip c9 given that c was excited. (iii) Exit of memory
throughactivation ofactiona,described byafixed‘‘output-coupler’’
function O(ajc).
In the following, we shall only consider finite agents, acting in a
finite world. Percepts, actions, and clips are then elements of finite-
sized sets, according to the following definitions:
?
Percept space:
s: s1,s2,...,sN ðÞ [S1|   |SN:S,s i 5 1, …, jSij. The struc-
ture of the percept space S, a cartesian product of sets, reflects the
compositional (categorical) structure of percepts (objects). For
example, s1 could label the category of shape, s2 category of color,
s3 category of size, etc. The maximum number of distinguishable
input states is given by the product S jj ~ S1 jj     SN jj .
?
Actuator space:
a: a1,a2,...,aM ðÞ [A1|   |AM:A,a j 5 1, …, jAjj. The
structure of the actuator space A reflects the categories (or, in
physics terminology, the degrees of freedom) of the agent’s
actions. For example a1 could label the state of motion, a2 the
state of a shutter, a3 the state of a warning signal, etc. All of this
depends on the specification of the agent and the environment.
The maximum number of different possible actions is given by
the product A jj ~ A1 jj     AM jj .
Clips or episodes are elementary, short-time, dynamic processes
in the agent’s memory that relate to past experience and that can
be triggered by similar experience. A clip can be seen as a
sequence of remembered (real or fictitious) percepts and actions.
We distinguish percept sgS that is directly caused by the envir-
onment at a given time t,f r o maremembered (or a fictitious)
percept m(s)gm(S) that has a certain representation in the agent’s
memory system. Similarly, we distinguish real actions agA exe-
cuted by the agents from remembered (or fictitious) actions
m(a)gm(A), which can be (re-)called by the agent without neces-
sarily leading to real action. Instead of the symbol m(a) we will
also use q a ; m(a) for a remembered action. The formal definition
of a clip reads then as follows:
?
Clip space:
c: c 1 ðÞ ,c 2 ðÞ ,...,c L ðÞ   
[C; c l ðÞ[m S ðÞ |m A ðÞ . The index L spe-
cifies the length of the clip. A simple example for L 5 2 is the clip
c5(m(s),m(a)) ; (q s ,q a),which corresponds toasimplepercept-
action pair. Clips of length L 5 1 consist of a single remembered
percept or action, respectively. In the subsequent examples, we
will mainly consider probabilistic networks of such simple clips.
Projective simulation is realized as a random walk in episodic
memory, which serves the agent to reinvoke past experience and
to compose fictitious experience before real action is taken.
Learning is achieved by evaluating past experience, for example by
simple reinforcement learning. In memory, this will lead to a modi-
fication of the transition probabilities between different clips, e.g. via
Bayesianupdating. Weemphasize,again,thatsuch kindoftheevalu-
ation happens entirely within memory space. If a certain percept-
action sequence s R a was rewarded at time step t, it will typically
mean that, in the subsequent time step t 1 1, the transition prob-
ability p
(t11)(ajs) between clips q s and q a will be enhanced. This is
only indirectly related to the conditional probability P
(t11)(ajs) for
real action a given percept s.
Forconvenience,andtoemphasizetheroleoffictitiousexperience
in episodic memory, we shall also introduce a third space which we
call
?
Emotion space:
e: e1,e2,...,eK ðÞ [E1|   |EK:E,e k 5 1, …, jEkj. In the
simplest case K 5 1 and jE1j 5 2, with a two-valued emotion
state e1:e[{ , }. Emotional states are tags, attached to transi-
tions between different clips in the episodic memory. The state of
thesetagscanbechangedthroughfeedback(e.g.reward)fromthe
environment. They are internal parameters and should be distin-
guished from the reward function itself, which is defined extern-
ally. Informally speaking, emotional states are remembered
rewards for previous actions, they have thus a similar status as
the clips.
The reward function L is a mapping from S 3 A to I5R (real
numbers),whereinmostsubsequentexamplesweconsiderthecaseI
5 0, 1, …, l. In the simplest case, l 5 1: If L(s, a) 5 1 then the
transition s R a is rewarded; if L(s, a) 5 0, it is not rewarded. A
rewarded(unrewarded)transitionwillsetcertainemotiontagsinthe
episodic memory to ( ), as discussed previously. We shall also
consider situations where the externally defined reward function
changes in time, which leads to an adaptation of the flags in the
agent’s memory.
Simple example: Invasion game. To illustrate some of these
concepts, let us consider the following simple game, which we call
invasion (see Figure 3). It has two parties, an attacker (A) and a
defender (D) (the robot/agent). The task of D is to defend a certain
region against invasion by A. The attacker A can enter the region
through doors in a wall, which are placed at equal distances. The
defender D can block a door and thereby prevent A from invasion.
Initially, defender D and attacker A stand face-to-face at some
door k, see Figure 3. Next, the attacker will move either to the left
or to the right, with the intention to pass through one of the adjacent
doors. For simplicity, we may imagine that A disappears at door k
andre-appearssometimetlaterinfrontofoneofthedoorsk21or
k 1 1. The defender D needs to guess – based on some information
which we will specify shortly – where A will reappear and move to
thatdoor.(WemayassumethatDmovesmuchfasterthanAsothat,
if its guess is correct, it will arrive at the next door before A). If A
arrives at an unblocked door, it counts as a successful passage/inva-
sion. The task of D is to hold off the attacker for as long (i.e. for as
many moves) as possible. We can define an appropriate blocking
efficiency. If A has successfully invaded, this particular duel is over,
and the robot D will be faced with a new attacker appearing in front
of the door presently occupied by the robot.
Suppose that the attacker A follows a certain strategy, which is
unknown to the robot D, but, before each move, A shows some
symbolthatindicatesitsnextmove.Inthesimplestcase,asillustrated
inFigure3,thiscouldbeasimplearrowpointingright,),orleft, ,
indicating the direction of the subsequent move. It could also be a
whole number, 6m, indicating how far A will move and in which
direction. The meaning of the symbols is a priori completely
Figure 3 | Game invasion. Defender agent D, whose task is to block the
passage against invasion by the attacker A, tries to guess A’s next move
from a symbol shown.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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guished by the robot. The only requirement we impose at the
moment is that the meaning of the symbol stays the same over a
sufficiently long period of time (longer than the learning time of the
robot).Translatedintoreallife,the‘‘symbol’’couldbeasmundaneas
the ‘‘direction into which the attacker turns it body’’ before disap-
pearing (a robot does not know what this means a priori), it could be
an expression on its face, or some abstract symbol that A uses to
communicate with subsequent invaders. The described setup is
reminiscent of certain behavior experiments with drosophila, using
a torsion-based flight simulator system and a reinforcement mech-
anismtotraindrosophilatoavoidobjectsinitsvisualfield
33,34.Inthis
sense, the presented analysis many also be interesting for the inter-
pretationofbehaviorexperimentswithdrosophilaorsimilarspecies.
Using this simple game, we want to illustrate in the following how
the robot can learn, i.e. increase its blocking efficiency by projective
simulation. We will consider different levels of sophistication of the
simulation process (recovering simple reinforcement learning and
associative learning as special cases).
Put into the language introduced in the previous section, we con-
sider a percept space that comprises two categories
– Symbol shown by attacker: { , )} 5 S1,
– Color of symbol: {red, blue} 5 S2,
while the actuator space comprises a single category
– Movement of defender: {2, 1} 5 A,
as does the emotion space
– Emoticons: { , } 5 E.
In memory space, , ﬁ, etc. correspond to memorized percepts/
actions that have been perceived/executed by the agent. In the
following, we regard and ﬁ as separate clips of length L 5 1.
The role of the emotional tags is to indicate, at a given time, which
ofthe transitions inclip spacehave recentlyled toarewarded action.
For the reward function L : S 3 A R 0, 1, …, l, we often consider
the simplest case l 5 1 (except where explicitly indicated). For
L(s, a) 5 1 (0) the transition s R a is rewarded (not rewarded). A
rewarded transition, L(s, a) 5 1, will set certain emotion tags in the
episodic memory to , which will influence the simulation
dynamics. We shall also consider situations where the attacker
changes its strategy over time, which leads to a time-dependent
reward function and a corresponding adaptation of the flags in the
agent’s memory.
The conditional probability that a running (or active) clip calls
clip ﬁ will be denoted by p
(n)(2j ), where the upper index n
indicates the time step (‘‘experience of the agent’’), i.e. how many
encounters with an attacker have occured.
Suppose that the attacker indicates with the symbols , ) that it
will move one door to the left, or to the right, respectively. Then, the
episodic memory that will be built up by the agent has the graph
structure as shown in Figure 4.
Projective simulation & learning without composition. As we have
mentioned earlier, the interaction of the agent with the environment
goesincycles.Inoursimpleexample,thedescriptionofthenthcycle
(or time step) is as follows: First, the agent perceives a percept s,
which induces the excitation of the percept clip q s . Here we assume
thatthisexcitationhappenswithunitprobability,whichcorresponds
to a simple choice for the input coupler function I(cjs) 5 d(c 2 q s )
introduced above. The excited percept clip q s then triggers the
excitation of action clip q a g{ﬁ, ›} with probability p
(n)(ajs). This
can happen either in direct sequence, or after some other memory
clips have been excited in between, as will be described in the follow-
ing subsection. The excitation of an actuator clip q a usually leads to
immediate (real) motor action a, corresponding to a simple choice
for the output coupler O(ajc) 5 d(c 2 q a ). But we will also consider
different scenarios where the translation into motor action may be
delayed and depend itself on the emotional tag of the transition q c R
q a ,resulting from a reward or penalty of that transition in previous
cycles. After motor action a has been taken, it will either be
rewarded or not. The result of this evaluation will then be fed back
into the state of the episodic memory, leading to an update of the
transition probabilities p(n11)(ajs) for the next cycle and of the
emotion state tagged to this transition. This completes the descrip-
tion of the n-th cycle.
Toprovideacompletedescriptionoftheepisodicmemorywenow
needtospecifytheupdaterules,i.e.howapositiveornegativereward
(L 5 1 or 0) changes the transition probability between the assoc-
iated clips. There are many choices possible. In the following, we
choose a simple frequency rule, somewhat reminiscent of Hebbian
learning in neural network theories, but we emphasize that other
rules are equally suitable
35.
We assume that, under positive feedback, the conditional prob-
abilities p
(n)(ajs), with ag{2,1}, sg{ , )}, grow in proportion
with the number of previous rewards following the clip transition
q s R q a . This means that, if, in time step n, the agent takes the
rewarded action a after having perceived percept s, this will increase
theprobabilitythat,insubsequenttimestepn11,anexcitedpercept
clip q s will excite an actuator clip q a . In other words, this will increase
theprobabilitythat,afterperceivingtheperceptsnexttime,theagent
will simulate the correct action a. Depending on the details how the
simulation is translated into real action, this will typically also
increase the probability that the agent executes the rewarded action.
Note, however, that the distinction between simulated action
and real action is an essential point and will give the agent more
flexibility.
Quantitatively, we define the transition probability p
(n)(ajs)i n
terms of a weight matrix h:
p n ðÞas j ðÞ ~
h n ðÞs,a ðÞ
h n ðÞs ðÞ
, ð1Þ
where h
(n)(s) is the marginal
h n ðÞs ðÞ ~
X
a[A
h n ðÞs,a ðÞ : ð2Þ
Figure 4 | Episodic memory that is built up by the defender-agent in
Figure3,iftheattackerfollowsthestaticstrategytomoveonedoortothe
left(right) aftershowing the symbol ()). The‘‘emotion tags’’ at each
of the transitions in the network indicate the associated feedback that is
storedinthememory’sevaluationsystem.Informally,emotiontagscanbe
seen as remembered rewards for previous actions. They help the agent to
evaluate the result of a simulation and to translate it into real action. If a
clip transition in the simulation leads subsequently to a rewarded action,
thestateofitstagisset(orconfirmed)to ,andthetransitionprobability
in the next simulation is amplified. Otherwise the tag is set to and the
transition probability is attenuated (or simply not amplified).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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so that the conditional probability distributions {p
(1)(ajs)}a are uni-
form for all s.
The stepwise evolution of p
(n)(ajs), as a function of n, is stochastic
and may, for a given agent, depend on the entire history of percepts
and the actions taken by the agent. Suppose that, in time step n, the
agent perceives symbol s
(n) and then executes action a
(n). There are
two possible cases which we need to distinguish.
Case (1): L(s
(n), a
(n)) 5 1, i.e. the agent did the ‘‘right thing’’ and
the percept-action sequence (s
(n), a
(n)) is rewarded. In this case, the
weight of the h matrix will be increased by unity on the transition q s
Rq a with s 5 s
(n) and a 5 a
(n), while it stays constant on all other
transitions.Tomodelthepossibilitythattheagentcanalsoforget,we
introduce an overall dissipation factor c (0 # c # 1) that drives the
weightsh
(n)(s,a)towardstheequilibrium(uniform)distribution.Put
together we thus have the update rule:
h nz1 ðÞ s,a ðÞ {h n ðÞs,a ðÞ ~d s,s n ðÞ
  
d a,a n ðÞ
  
{c h n ðÞs,a ðÞ {1
hi
:
ð4Þ
Case (2): L(s
(n), a
(n)) 5 0, i.e. the agent did the ‘‘wrong thing’’ and the
percept-action sequence (s
(n), a
(n)) is not rewarded. In this case, all
weights of the h-matrix are simply decreased:
h nz1 ðÞ s,a ðÞ {h n ðÞs,a ðÞ ~{c h n ðÞs,a ðÞ {1
hi
: ð5Þ
The two cases can be combined into a single formula
h nz1 ðÞ s,a ðÞ {h n ðÞs,a ðÞ ~{c h n ðÞs,a ðÞ {1
hi
zld s,s n ðÞ
  
d a,a n ðÞ
   ð6Þ
with ; L(s
(n),a
(n)), whichalso generalizes to asituation with values
of the reward function L different from 0 and 1.
From the updated weights h
(n11)(s, a), we obtain the transition
probabilities (in clip space) for the next cycle,
p nz1 ðÞ ajs ðÞ ~
h nz1 ðÞ s,a ðÞ
P
a h nz1 ðÞ s,a ðÞ
: ð7Þ
The updating of the weights from h
(n)(s, a)t oh
(n11)(s, a) at the end
of cycle n thus depends on which specific percept-action sequence
(s
(n), a
(n)) has actually occurred in cycle n. The probability for the
latter is given by the joint probability distribution P
(n)(s, a) 5
P
(n)(s)P
(n)(ajs)for(s,a)5(s
(n),a
(n)).WhileP
(n)(s)willbegivenextern-
ally (it is controlled by the attacker, for example P
(n)(s) 5 1/jSj for
random attacks), the conditional probability P
(n)(ajs) will depend on
the memory, that is, on the weights h
(n)(s, a) and how the simulation
is translated into real action.
In the simplest model, the agent has reflection time 1, which
corresponds to the following process. Initially the percept s activates
the percept clip q s . This excites the actuator clip q a with probability
p
(n)(ajs). Regardless of whether the action a was previously rewarded
ornot, q a iscoupledout,i.e.,itistranslatedintotheactiona.Inother
words, any transition that ends up in a clip describing some ‘‘virtual
action’’,leadstothecorrespondingrealaction.Inthiscase,weobtain
P n ðÞajs ðÞ ~p n ðÞajs ðÞ ~
h n ðÞs,a ðÞ
P
a h n ðÞs,a ðÞ
, ð8Þ
which complements the update rules of Eqs. (4) and (5), together
with Eq. (1).
A slightly more sophisticated model is obtained when the state of
theemotiontags( or ),whichissetbypreviousrewards,isused
to affirm or inhibit immediate motor action. In this model, the
memory is one step further detached from immediate action and
the agent has a chance to ‘‘reflect’’ upon its action. To be specific,
letusconsiderastrategywithreflectiontimeR,whichcorrespondsto
the following process. As in the previous case, initially the percept s
activates the percept clip q s , which activates the actuator clip q a with
probability p
(n)(ajs). However, only if the sequence q s R q a is tagged
(i.e. it was evaluated L(s, a) 5 1 on the last encounter), the
actuator clip q a is ‘‘coupled out’’, i.e. translated into a real action. If
thisisnotthecase(eitherthetransitionwasnotevaluatedbeforeorit
was evaluated ), the percept clip q s is re-excited, which in turn
activates again some actuator clip (where and q a may be the
same or different). If the new sequence (s, a9) is tagged , triggers
realactuatormotiona9.Otherwise,theprocessisagainrepeated. For
a model with reflection time R, the maximum number of repetitions
is R 2 1. At the end of the Rth round, the simulation must exit from
any actuator clip, regardless of its previous evaluations. We are spe-
cificallyinterestedinthesuccessprobabilityP n ðÞa 
sjs
  
thatthe agent
chooses a rewarded action a 
s after a given percept s L s,a 
s
  
~1
  
.
For reflection time R, this is given by
P n ðÞa 
sjs
  
~1{ 1{p n ðÞa 
sjs
      R
, ð9Þ
which increases with R. Clearly, for larger reflection times the mem-
ory is used more efficiently.
In our invasion game, the quantity of interest is the blocking
efficiency, r
(n), which corresponds to the average success probability
(averaged over different percepts, i.e. symbols shown by the
attacker).Afterthenthround,theblockingefficiencyisthusgivenby
Figure 5 | Learningcurvesofthedefenderagentfordifferentvaluesofthe
dissipation rate c. The blocking efficiency increases with time and
approaches its maximum value exponentially fast in the number of cycles.
For c 5 0 the blocking efficiency approaches the limiting value 1, i.e. for
eachshownperceptitwillchoosetherightaction.Forlargervaluesofc,the
maximum achievable blocking efficiency is reduced, since the agent forgets
part of what it has learnt. At time step n 5 250, the meaning of symbols is
inverted, i.e. the symbol ) ( ) now indicates that the attacker is going to
move left (right). Since the agent has already built up memory, it needs
some time to adapt to the new situation. One can see a trade-off between
adaptation speed, one one side, and achievable blocking efficiency, on the
other side. Here, we have chosen an unbiased training strategy, P
(n) 5
15 |S |. The curves are averages of the learning curves for an ensemble of
1000 agents. Error bars (indicating 1 standard deviation over the sample
mean)areshownoneveryfifthdatapointnottoclutterthediagram,which
also applies to the error bars in subsequent Figures.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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X
s[S
P n ðÞs ðÞ P n ðÞa 
sjs
  
: ð10Þ
In a similar way one can define the learning time t(rth) for a given
strategyasthetimeittakes onaverage(over anensemble ofidentical
agents)untiltheblockingefficiency reachesacertainthresholdvalue
rth.
In the following, we show numeric results for different agent spe-
cifications. Let us start with agents with reflection time R 5 1. In
Figure 5, we plot the learning curves for different values of the dis-
sipation rate c (forgetfulness). One can see that the blocking effi-
ciency increases with time and approaches its maximum value
typically exponentially fast in the number of cycles. For small values
of c it approaches the limiting value 1, i.e. the agent will choose the
right action for every shown percept. For increasing values of c,w e
see that the maximum achievable blocking efficiency is reduced,
since the agent keeps forgetting part of what it has learnt. At time
stepn5250,theattackersuddenlychangesthemeaningofsymbols:
) ( ) now indicates that the attacker is going to move left (right).
Since the agent has already built up memory, it needs some time to
adapt to the new situation. Here, one can see that forgetfulness can
also have a positive effect. For weak dissipation, the agent needs
longer to unlearn, i.e. to dissipate its memory and adapt to the new
situation. Thus there is a trade-off between adaptation speed, on one
side,andachievableblockingefficiency,ontheotherside.Depending
on whether learning speed or achievable efficiency is more import-
ant,onewillchoosetheagentspecificationaccordingly.Notethatfor
random action, which is obtained by setting l 5 0 in (6), the average
blocking is 0.5 (not shown in Figure 5).
Note that the existence of an adaptation period in Figure 5 (after
time step n 5 250) relates to the fact that symbols which the agent
had already learnt, suddenly invert their meaning in terms of the
reward function. So the learnt behavior will, with high probability,
leadtounrewardedactions.Adifferent situationisofcoursegiven, if
the agent is confronted with a new symbol that it had not perceived
before. In Figure 6, we have enlarged the percept space and intro-
duced color as an additional percept category. In terms of the
invasion game, this means that the attacker can announce its next
move by using symbols of different shapes and colors. In the first
period, the symbols seen by the agent have a specific color (red),
while at n 5 250 the color suddenly changes (blue), and the agent
has to learn the meaning of the symbols with the new color. Note
that,unlikeFigure5,thereisnownoinversionofstrategies,andthus
no increased adaptation time. The agent simply has never seen blue
symbols before, and has to learn their meaning from scratch.
The network behind Figure 6 is the same as in Figure 4, with the
same update rules, but with an extended percept space (four sym-
bols) and four rewarded transitions. The agent does not make use of
the ‘‘similarity’’ between symbols with the same shape but with dif-
ferentcolors.This willchangeinthenextsubsection, whenweintro-
duce the idea of composition as another feature of projective
simulation, which will allow us to realize an elementary example of
associate learning.
Let us now come back to the notion of reflection. In Figure 7, we
compare the performance of agents with different values of the
reflection time R. (Here we consider again training with symbols of
a single color.) One can see that larger values of the reflection time
lead to an increased learning speed. The reason is that during the
simulation virtual percept-action sequences are recalled together
with the associated emotion tags (i.e. remembered rewards). If the
associated tag does not indicate a previous reward of the simulated
transition, the coupling-out of the actuator into motor action is
suppressed and the simulation goes back to the initial clip. In this
sense, the agent can ‘‘reflect upon’’ the right action and its (empir-
icallylikely) consequences bymeans of an iterated simulation, and is
thus more likely to find the right actuator move before real action
takes place.
The possibility of reflection can thus significantly increase the
speed of learning, at least as long the total time for the simulation
doesnotbecometoolongandstartscompetingwithother,externally
given time scales, such as frequency of attacks.
We next investigate the performance of the agent for more com-
plexenvironmentinordertoillustratethescalabilityofourmodel.In
the invasion game, anatural scalingparameter is givenby the size jSj
of the percept space (number of doors through which attacker can
invade) and/or the size jAj of the actuator space. In Figure 8, we plot
the learning curves (evolution of the average blocking efficiency) for
different values of jSj,jAj,and the reward parameter l.It canbe seen
Figure 6 | Learning curve for enlarged percept space, with color as an
additional percept category. In the first period, the symbols seen by the
agenthavethesame color(e.g. red),whileattimestep n5200thecolorof
the symbols suddenly changes (e.g. blue), and the agent has to learn the
meaning of the symbol with the new color. Unlike Figure 5, there is no
inversion of strategies, and thus no increased adaptation time. The agent
simply has not seen symbols with the new color before, and thus has to
learn them from scratch. Ensemble average over 1000 runs with error bars
indicating one standard deviation.
Figure 7 | Performance of agents with different values of the reflection
time: R 5 1 (lower curve) and R 5 2 (upper curve). One can see that a
large value of the reflection time leads to an increased learning speed. The
dissipationrate(whichisameasureofforgetfulnessoftheagent)isinboth
casesc51/50.Ensembleaverageover1000runswitherrorbarsindicating
one standard deviation.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2 : 400 | DOI: 10.1038/srep00400 7that both the learning speed and the asymptotic blocking efficiency
depends (for fixed value of damping c) on the size of percept and
actuator space and decreases with their problem size.
As a figure of merit we have looked at the learning time t 5 t0.9,
which we define as the time the agent needs to achieve a certain
blocking efficiency (for which we choose 90% of the maximum
achievable value). We find that learning time increases linearly in
both jSj and jAj, (i.e. quadratically in N, if we set N 5 jAj 5 jSj). The
same scaling can be observed if we apply standard learning algo-
rithms like Q-learning or AHC
1 to the invasion game
35.I n
Figure9,thescalingofthelearningtimeisshownfordifferentvalues
of R. Besides the linear scaling with jSj, it can be seen how reflections
inclipspace,as partofthe simulation,speedupthe learningprocess.
Wehavealsoperformedananalyticstudywhichisconsistentwith
our numerical results (see Figure 8 and Methods).
Projective simulation & learning with composition I. The possibility
of multiple reflections, as discussed in the previous subsection
(Figure 7), illustrates an advantage of having a simulation platform
where previous experience can be reinvoked and evaluated before
real action is taken.
The episodic memory described in Figure 4 was of course a quite
elementary and special instance of the general scheme of Figure 2.
We have assumed that the activation of a percept clip is immediately
followed by the activation of an actuator clip, simulating a simple
percept-action sequence. This can obviously be generalized along
various directions. In the following, we shall discuss one generaliza-
tion, where the excitation of a percept clip may be followed by a
sequence of jumps to other, intermediate clips, before it ends up in
anactuatorclip.Theseintermediateclips maycorrespond tosimilar,
previously encountered percepts, realizing some sort of associative
memory, but they may also describe clips that are spontaneously
created and entirely fictitious (see next subsection).
Such ascenario,whichgeneralizes thesituationofFigure4,canbe
summarized by the following rules.
1. Every percept s triggers a sequence of memory clips C 5
(q s , ,…, ,q a ), starting with q s and ending with some
actuator clip q a . The number D denotes the deliberation length
of the sequence. The case D 5 0 corresponds, per definition, to
the direct sequence C 5 (q s ,q a ).
Thisisillustrated schematicallyinFigure10,whereweshowan
example of an episodic memory architecture with sequences of
deliberation length D 5 0 and D 5 1 is shown. Here, after
excitation of the percept clip, the agent may either excite an
actuator clip directly, or first excite some other intermediate
clip which, in its turn, activates an actuator clip. We shall
sometimes refer to the former sequence as ‘‘direct’’, and to
the latter as ‘‘compositional’’.
2. If (s, a) corresponds to a rewarded percept-action pair (i.e. it
was rewarded in a recent cycle and the corresponding emotion
tag is set to ), then the simulation is left and the actuator clip
q a is translated into real action a. Otherwise, a new (random)
sequence C95(q s , ,…, , )isgenerated, startingwiththe
same percept clip q s but ending possibly with a different actu-
ator clip . The (maximum) number of fictitious clip
sequences that may occur before real action is taken is given
bythereflection timeR.(Notethatthereisacertainfreedomas
to which part of the sequence the tag should be associated. A
simplestchoice,whichwefollowhere,isthatthetagrefersonly
to the states of the initial and the final clip.)
Figure 8 | Initial growth and asymptotic value of average blocking
efficiencyfordifferentsizesofpercept( |S |)andactuator( |A |)space,and
reward parameter l. The learning curves are obtained from a numerical
average over an ensemble of 10000 runs with random percept stimulation
(c 5 0.01). Error bars (not shown) are of the order of the fluctuations in
the learning curves). The analytic lines are obtained from (25), see
Methods.
Figure 9 | Learningtimet0.9asafunctionof |S | fordifferentvaluesofthe
reflectionparameterR. Weobservealineardependenceoft0.9on |S | with
a slope determined by R. Ensemble average over 10000 runs, c 5 0.
Figure 10 | Projective simulation with composition with deliberation
lengthD50,1. Darkgrayovalsindicateperceptclipsandlightdarkovals
indicateactuatorclips.Initiallytheperceptclipisexcited.Thismaydirectly
excite some actuator clip (‘‘Direct transitions’’), or some other memory
clip or fictitious clip (‘‘Composition’’). In the latter case, the memory (or
fictitious) clip in its turn excites an actuator clip.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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minedbytheweightsh
(n)(c,c9)oftheedgesofadirectedgraph
36
connecting the corresponding clips:
p n ðÞc0jc ðÞ ~
h n ðÞc,c0 ðÞ
P
c00 h n ðÞc,c00 ðÞ
ð11Þ
wherethesuminthedenominatorrunsoverallclips thatare
connected with q c by an outgoing edge (i.e. an edge directed
from q c to ).
4. Afterthesimulationincyclenisconcluded,someactionwillbe
taken which we denote by a
(n). If the action a
(n) is rewarded (i.e.
L(s
(n),a
(n))51),thentheweightsofalltransitionsthatoccurred
in the preceding simulation will be enhanced:
(i) The weights of transitions q a R that appear in the simu-
lated sequence C5(q s ,…,q c , ,…, q a ) with s 5 s(n) and a 5
a
(n) increase by the amount
Dzh n ðÞsi,siz1   
~K for i~1,...,D{1,
Dzh n ðÞs,s1   
~Dzh n ðÞsD,a
  
~1:
ð12Þ
(ii) In addition, the weight of the direct transition q s R q a will
also be increased by unity
Dzh n ðÞs,a ðÞ ~1: ð13Þ
The parameter K thereby quantifies the growth rate of ‘‘asso-
ciative’’ (or compositional) connections relative to the direct
connections.
(iii) Furthermore, the weights of all transitions in the clip net-
work, including those which were not involved in the pre-
ceding simulation, will be decreased according to the rule
D h n ðÞc,c0 ðÞ ~{c h n ðÞc,c0 ðÞ {h0 c,c0 ðÞ
  
, ð14Þ
which describes damping towards a stationary value
h0 c,c0 ðÞ ~
1, if c[S and c0[A
K, if c[S and c0 [S
  
, ð15Þ
which distinguishes again direct connections from composi-
tional connections, as illustrated in Figure 10. If the chosen
actiona
(n)attheendofcyclenisnotrewarded,thennoweights
are enhanced and only rule (iii) applies.
5. Concerning the initialization of the weights, various possibil-
ities exist.Weights thatareinitialized to unitydescribe asort of
‘‘innate’’ or a priori connections between a set of basic percepts
and actuators. Other weights may initially be set to zero, for
example on connections to more complex percepts, for which
there are no innate action patterns available. A simple rule that
allows the connectivity of the memory (graph of the clip net-
work) to grow through new perceptual input, is the following:
If a percept clip is activated for the first time, all incoming
connections to that clip are ‘‘activated’’ together with it, mean-
ing that their weights are initialized to a finite value (which we
also set to K in the following). This enables the accessibility of
that clip from other clips.
To illustrate the workings of compositional memory, let us revisit
the situation of Figure 6, where the percept space S 5 S1 3 S2
comprises both the categories of shape, s1gS1, and color, s2gS2
(the color of the shape), while the actuator space A and the emotion
space E contain the same elements as before. This is a variant of the
invasion game, where the attacker can announce its next move using
symbols of different shapes and colors. The network of clips behind
the learning curves presented in Figure 6 was simply a duplicated
version of the graph in Figure 4, with identical subgraphs for the two
sets of percepts of the same color.
In contrast, in Figure 11, we see the learning curves for the same
gamebutwithaslightlymodifiedmemoryarchitecture.Afterhaving
Figure 11 | Associativelearningthroughprojectivesimulation. Afterfirst
trainingtheagentwithsymbolsofonecolor(red),attimestepn5200the
attacker starts to use a different color (blue). In comparison with Figure 6,
now the agent learns faster. This situation resembles a form of‘‘associative
learning’’,whentheagent‘‘recognizes’’asimilaritybetweentheperceptsof
different colors, but identical shapes. The effect can be much enhanced if
one allows for reflection times R . 1. The memory that gives rise to these
learning curves is depicted in Figure 12. Ensemble average over 10000
agents.
Figure 12 | Effects of associative learning on the state of the episodic
memory at different times. The thickness of the lines indicate the
transition probabilities between different clips. (a) Initial network, before
any percept has affected the agent, (b) State of the network after the agent
has been trained (dotted arrows) with symbols of one color (red).
(c)Whentheagentispresentedwithsymbolsofadifferentcolor(blue),the
estabished links will direct the simulation process (probabilisically) to the
previously ‘‘trained’’ region with well-developed links. This realizes a sort
of associative memory.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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200 the attacker starts using a different color (blue). In comparison
with Figure 6, now the agent learns faster, and the speed of learning
increases with the strength of the parameter K. This situation resem-
bles a form of ‘‘associative learning’’, where the agent ‘‘recognizes’’ a
similarity between the percepts of different colors (but identical
shapes).
The structure of the memory that gives rise to these learning
curves is sketched in Figure 12, which corresponds to a duplicated
network described before, albeit with additional links between
percepts of equal shape but different color. In Figure 12, we see
the effect of learning on the state of the network at different times.
Initially, before any stimulus/percept has affected the agent, the
network looks as in Figure 12(a), with innate connections of unit
weight between all possible percepts and actuators, respectively.
Figure 12(b) shows the state of the network after the agent has
been trained (indicated by the dotted arrows) with symbols of one
color (red). We see that the weights for rewarded transitions have
grown substantially such that the presentation of a red symbol will
lead to the rewarded actuator move with high probability.
Moreover, the activation of the red-percept clips has initialized
the incoming connections from similar percept clips with a dif-
ferent (blue) color. In this example, the weights are initialized with
the value K. This initialization has, at this stage, no effect on the
learning performance for symbols with a red color. However,
when the agent is presented with symbols of a different color,
the established links will direct the simulation process (probabil-
istically) to a ‘‘trained’’ region with well-developed links. This
realizes a sort of associative memory (Figure 12(c)). In the philo-
sophy of projective simulation, association is a special instance of
a simulation process, namely a random walk in clip space where
similar clips can call each other with certain probabilities.
Note that, in case of the associative learning, only the incoming
links (i.e. transitions) to that percept are activated together with it,
thereby making its subsequent links potentially available to similar
new percepts. A network where also outgoing links are activated
performs typically worse, in particular when the size of the percept
space (number of colors) grows. In that case, even when a single
percept is trained, the agent has to explore all similar percepts
together with it, which may lead to a significant slowing down of
the learning speed.
InFigure13,wediscussfurtheraspectsofassociativelearningthat
follow from the rules of the projective simulation. We saw in
Figure 11 that the learning speed increases with the parameter K,
which describes the relative rate at which the weights of the com-
positional connections grow relative to the direct connections.
However, too large values of K can also have a counterproductive
effect, as the agent spends an increasing fraction of time with the
simulation before it takes real action. In fact, it can almost get ‘‘lost’’
inaloop-likescenariowhere itjumpsback andforthbetween virtual
percept clips for a long time. In Figure 13, we plot the average delib-
eration time, i.e. the average time for which the simulation stays in
compositional memory. The scenario is the same as in Figure 11.
After the change of color of the symbols, the agent will learn by
building up new transitions in the network, but this learning will
be assisted by using the pre-established transitions of the previous
training period (Figure 12(c)), which will increase the deliberation
Figure 14 | (a) Learning curve for different values of the associativity
parameter K if the agent, by external constraints, has only a finite time
available to produce an action. If the simulation takes longer than Dmax,
the agent willnot berewarded.In sucha case,the asymptotic performance
of the learning drops dramatically for large values of K. An ensemble
average over 10000 games is shown.
Figure 15 | To obtain an agent with both high flexibility to adapt to new
attack strategies, and with a high blocking efficiency, one can combine a
finite dissipation ratec (flexibility) with anincreased reflection timeR 5
2 (efficiency). The plots should be compared with Figure 5. Ensemble
average over 10000 games.
Figure 13 | Average deliberation time, i.e. the average time how long the
simulationstaysincompositionalmemory. Adeliberationtimethatistoo
longwill,inthisexample,haveanegativeeffectonthelearningfidelityasit
willalsohaveanincreasedaccesstoother,worngchannels.Dissipationrate
c51/50; ensemble average over 10000 agents.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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changeofcolors,anddecreasesagainastheagentisdevelopingdirect
connectionsfromtheperceptclipstotherewardedactuatorclips.For
K 5 2, however, the deliberation time continues to grow with the
number of cycles, until it settles at some value around 1.4 (not
shown). For larger values of K, the asymptotic average deliberation
time can be significantly larger. In the network of Figure 12(c) the
latter situation means that the simulation can get lost in a loop by
jumping back and forth between similar (red and blue) clips. While
in the simple example of Figure 12(c) this may be avoided by certain
adhocmodificationsoftheupdaterule,itisagenericfeaturethatwill
persist in more complex networks.
A deliberation (i.e. simulation) time that is too long will, in this
example, eventually have a negativee f f e c to nt h ea c h i e v a b l eb l o c k i n g
efficiency, as can be seen from the long-time limit of the learning
curves in Figure 11. A slight decrease of the asymptotic blocking
efficiency for larger values of K occurs because, by association, the
simulation will also gain access to other unrewarded transitions inside
the network. The potentially negative effect of high values of K gets
more pronounced if the agent, by external constraints, only has a finite
time available to produce an action. In our example of the invasion
game, this could be the time it takes for the attacker to move from one
door to the next. This introduces a maximum deliberation time Dmax
to our scheme. If the simulation takes longer than Dmax,t h ea g e n t
arrives too late at the door even if it chose the right one, and will
consequently not be rewarded. In such a case, the asymptotic perform-
ance of the learning for large values of K drops significantly, as can be
seen in Figure 14 for Dmax 5 2. For short times, when the strengths of
the transitions have not yet grown too large, the simulation still ben-
efits from the association effect where, after jumping from a percept
clip (red) to percept clip (blue), there will be a strong transition
to an actuator. For longer times however, the weights on the composi-
tional links have grown so strongly that they will also dominate over
the direct links from percept clips to actuator clips. In summary, while
compositional memory can help, too large values of K can be counter-
productive, as the agent will most of the time be ‘‘busy with itself’’.
Before we proceed in the following subsection to discuss yet
another possibility how to use the compositional memory for learn-
ing, it should be noted that many of the observed features can be
changed by varying the parameters c, R, K in the update rules, or by
modifying the ways of initializing the memory. For example, as we
haveseenearlier(inFigure5),dissipationintroducesamechanismof
forgetting, which limits the achievable success probability but at the
same time gives the agent more flexibility of adapting to a new
strategy of the attacker. To have an agent with both a high flexibility
and a high blocking efficiency, one can choose a finite value of
dissipation rate c together with an increased reflection time R,a si s
demonstrated in Figure 15. A similar enhancement can be observed
for the associativity effect in Figure 11 by increasing R.
Anotherpossibilitytoincreasetheachievableefficiencyistoletthe
connections of the network dissipate completely when they are not
used. While the innate network is characterized by a high connectiv-
ity, a trained network will develop both enhanced and suppressed
connections.
Projective simulation & learning with composition II.In the previous
subsection we saw that projective simulation allowed for associative
learning: A novel percept (clip), which had no a priori preference for
any actuator movement, could excite another clip in episodic mem-
ory, from which strong links to specific actuators had been built-up
bypreviousexperience.Theagent,whilepresentedwithabluearrow,
would, with a certain probability, associate it with a red arrow whose
meaning it was already familiar with.
A different and more complex behavior can be generated if the
agent’s actions are not only guided by recalling episodes from the
past, but if it can create, as part of the simulation process itself,
fictitious episodes that were never perceived before. In the course
of the simulation it may for example introduce variations of stored
episodes, or it may merge different episodes to a new one, thereby
varying or redefining the (virtual) past. The test for all such projec-
tions is whether or not the resulting (factual) actions will eventually
be rewarded. In other words, it is the performance of the agent in its
real life, that selects those virtual episodes that have led to successful
actions,enhancingthecorrespondingconnectionsinmemory.These
principles give the agent a notion of freedom
4 to ‘‘play around’’ with
itsepisodicmemories,whileatthesametimeoptimizingitsperform-
ance in the environment.
While it is intuitively clear that such additional capability will be
beneficial for the agent, its world (i.e. task environment) must be
sufficiently complex to make use of this capability. A typical feature
of a complex environment is that the agent can, at some point,
‘‘discover’’ new behavioral options that were previously not consid-
ered, i.e., not in the standard repertoire of its actions.
To map the essential aspects of such a complex situation into
our example, we imagine a modification of our invasion game
where the defender-agent can move in two dimensions, i.e. up
and down in addition to left and right. In our notation, this
corresponds to an enlarged actuator space A 5 A1 3 A2 with
a~ a1,a2 ðÞ [ z,0,{ fg |z ,0,{ fg such that, with this notation,
right; (1, 0), left; (–, 0), up; (0, 1), down; (0, –). In a robot
design, the actuators a1 and a2 would refer to different motors for
motion in x and y direction. One can imagine a two-dimensional
array of doors in the x-y plane, through which the attacker tries to
pass, now entering from the third dimension (z-axis). The attacker
will move along any of these four directions as well, and use appro-
priate symbols to announce itsmoves. However, in addition to those
moves,itwillatsomepointstartmovingalsoalongthediagonals,e.g.
to the upper-left, in a single step. The defender will first continue to
move in the trained directions, simply because the more complex
motion along the diagonal is not in its immediate repertoire
(although it may technically be able to do it, e.g. by activating the
twomotors for horizontal and vertical motionat the same time). We
assume that there are partial rewards if the defender moves into the
right quadrant, e.g. by ‘‘blocking’’ at least one of the coordinates of
the attacker. To be specific, we consider the situation where, from a
certainpointon,theattackeralwaysmovestotheupper-rightcorner
(i.e. along the 145u diagonal). If the agent moves right or up, it will
be rewarded, if it moves left or down, it will not. Under the rules
specified so far, the agent will, after a transient phase of random
motions, be trained so that it will move either up or right, with equal
probability of , 50% each. How can the agent conceive of the ‘‘idea’’
that it could also move along the diagonal direction, by letting both
motors run simultaneously, if this composite action was not in its
immediate (or: active) repertoire? The scenario of projective simu-
lation allows for the possibility that, through random clip composi-
tion, a merged or mutated clip can be created that triggers both
motors of a composite actuator move. In a sense, the agent would
simulate this movement, by chance, before it tries it out in real life.
The latter may occur specifically in situations with multiple rewards
(or ambivalent moves).
One can think of several possibilities of defining clip merging and
variation. A natural possibility exists if, in generalizing our scheme,
we allow for parallel excitations of several clips at the same time.
Depending on some compatibility constraints, more than one of
these clips could then couple out and lead to simultaneous actuator
moves.
In the present scenario, however, the simulator can only activate
one clip at a time, but it will happen that two of the clips (e.g. those
associated to right and up) are activated frequently and with similar
probabilities. Here one can e.g. define a threshold scheme where a
merging of both clips is likely to happen only under the condition
that the connections to both of them are sufficiently strong.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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orderprocess,whereitcanhappenallthetime,butwithprobabilities
that are proportional to the product of the individual excitation
probabilities.) The merging itself can be defined on the set of basic
elements which make up the clips, obeying certain syntactic con-
straints. For example, in the case of the two-dimensional invasion
game,wemaymergetheactuatorclipscorresponding toright5(1,
0) and up 5 (0, 1) into a new clip corresponding to right-up ; (1,
1), but it is syntactically forbidden to merge right 5 (1, 0) and left
5 (2, 0).
To demonstrate the basic idea, we have implemented a rule
according to which the frequent excitation of different actuator clips
(ofsyntactically compatiblemoves)fromasingleperceptclipcreates
at some point a novel, merged, actuator clip which becomes part of
the clip network. Figure 16 illustrates the schematic evolution of the
(relevant part of the) clip network. The grey arrows indicate prev-
iously grown transitions, after the agent has been trained in the
horizontal())andvertical(X)directions.Aftersuchaninitialtrain-
ing period, the agent is confronted (dotted arrow) with diagonal
moves (see left part of Figure 16), announced by the symbol ( ).
When the weights on the two different transitions leaving clip
grow beyond a given threshold, a new merged clip is created and
connectedto ,with aweightthatisequaltothesum oftheweights
on the constitutive transitions. This merging process is indicated
schematically in the right part of Figure 16.
In Figure 17, we show the resulting learning curve of the agent,
which was previously trained (n , 0, not shown) on the horizontal
and vertical directions (using symbols , ) and X, Y, respectively)
and is then (at time n 5 0) confronted with moves of the attacker
along the diagonal (announced by the symbol ( )). The preceding
training of the agent on the horizontal and vertical directions is not
strictly necessary, in this example, if one assumes that there is an a
priori connection between the percept clip and the actuator clips
(1,0)and(0,1).Otherwise,thefunctionoftheprecedingtrainingis
to activate those actuator clips for the first time and with it new
incoming connections. We assume a reinforcement scheme where
a movement into the correct quadrant (either right or up)i s
rewarded by a unit increase of the corresponding weights in the clip
network, while a composite movement right-up (both right and up)
is rewarded stronger, with l 5 4. One can see that the agent will first
quickly learn to move into the right quadrant – under the rules
described in the previous subsections – while on a longer time scale
it will discover the corresponding composite move with the higher
reward.
Connection with existing literature. The problem of learning has
been investigated in various fields ranging from psychology,
cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy, to artificial intelligence,
machine learning, and robotics. In the following, we shall compare
our model with some of the works in these fields.
Historically, the idea of using internal representations and simula-
tions for learning and prediction was already recognized as a key
ingredient for cognitive development in the works by Tolman
9 (idea
of cognitive maps) and Piaget
10 (role of the internal manipulation of
representations). The notion of episodic memory was introduced in
psychology in the 1970s by Tulving
7 and Ingvar
8, and has since been
attracting increasing attention in various fields. The specific role of
episodic memory for simulating future events has recently been dis-
cussed by Schacter et al.
13 in the neurosciences, and by Hasselmo
14
who discusses brain mechanisms for episodic memory.
Concepts and ideas for learning play also a major role in artificial
intelligence, machine learning and robotics. The problem of predic-
tion is indeed one of the main topics in machine learning, starting
with the seminal work of Holland
28 who introduced the notion of
classifier systems, and many subsequent works have used ideas of
internalsimulationforplanningandprediction(forexample
23–27and
referencesinreinforcementlearningasdiscussedbelow).Whileclas-
sifiers
28 bear a certain similarity with the notion of clips that we have
introducedinthispaper,thereareimportantdifferences.First,learn-
ing classifier systems assume a population or ensemble of classifiers
(i.e.condition-actionrules)andinvolveadeterministiccomputation
(ofthe average prediction ofa sub-ensemble of classifiers advocating
a certain action), after which a specific action is chosen. The random
walkthroughtheclipnetwork,incontrast,ismuchmoreprimitive;it
involvesnoensembleandnocomputation.Instead,itamountstothe
random hopping through a set of possible clips (including the pos-
sibility of creating new clips along the way), without the ability of
choosing, sampling, averaging, or in any way optimizing over that
set.Everyprojectivesimulationcorrespondstoasingletrajectoryofa
stochastic process (this is important for subsequent quantum gen-
eralization, as will be shown below).
Figure 17 | Learning curve of a 2D agent (see text) which, after having
been trained on the horizontal and vertical directions (using symbols ,
) and X, Y, respectively) is suddenly confronted, at time n 5 0 with
moves of the attacker along the diagonal, announced by the symbol .
We assume a reinforcement scheme where a movement in the right
quadrant (either right or up) is rewarded by a unit increase of the
corresponding clip transitions, while a composite movement along the
diagonaldirection(145)isrewardedstronger,e.g.byl54.Theagentwill
first quickly learn to move into the right quadrant – under the rules
described in the previous sections – while on a longer time scale it will
discover the corresponding composite move with the higher reward.
Figure 16 | Creationofanewandfictitiousclipinthememoryofthetwo-
dimensional agent. This figure illustrates the schematic evolution of the
(relevantpartofthe)clipnetworkbehindFigure17.Frequentexcitationof
two different actuator clips from a single percept clip leads to the creation
of a novel, merged, clip which becomes part of the existing clip network.
(See main text.)
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1, a number of ideas have
been discussed which are in some sense related to our work
15–22.
This concerns in particular the notion of experience replay by Lin
15
and recent work by Sutton et al.
19 on which we shall focus in the
following. The work by Lin
15 studies several extensions to standard
reinforcement learning algorithms, the most relevant of which, for
our present work, is the method of experience replay. In Lin’s model,
‘‘by experience replay, the learning agent simply remembers its past
experiences and repeatedly presents the experiences to its learning
algorithm as if the agent experienced again and again what it had
experienced before’’ (
15,p. 299). This idea of experience replay has a
certain similarity with the our notion of multiple reflections in clip
space (indicated by the parameter R in Equation (9) and in Figure 7);
yet, a closer inspection reveals both conceptual and technical differ-
ences. The main effect of experience replay in the sense of Lin is to
boost the learning process which, in our model, would amount to an
(off-line) changeofthe weights inthe clipnetwork. Experience replay
is like a module for (self-)teaching: After experiencing a real situation
once, the agent gets the chance to review this experience again and
again, before taking the next action. Our notion of episodic memory
differs from this one inasmuch as it uses an explicit internal repres-
entation and allowsmoresubtle ways ofre-usingprevious experience.
For example, the occurrence of multiple reflections, which also boost
thelearningspeed,isconditionedonthestateofcertainemotionflags
that represent short-time memory. These flags prevent the agent
from taking an action that was recently found non-rewarded and
give the agent a ‘‘second chance’’ to find the right action, but these
internal reflections do not change the weights of the clip network. As
a second example, the possibility of clip composition introduces
structural changes that also go beyond mere changes of the weights
in the clip network. Generally speaking,projective simulation is more
integrated with the real actions of the agent; it is a continuous process
that runs in parallel (‘‘on-line’’) with the real actions.
The work by Sutton et al.
16,19 on Dyna-style planning seems in that
respectcloser toour work. Quoting fromRef.
19: ‘‘Dyna-style planning
proceeds by generating imaginary experience from the world model
and then applying model-free reinforcement learning algorithms’’,
this sounds reminiscent to the use of projective simulation to gen-
erate fictitious sequences of memory to guide subsequent action. The
underlying conceptual framework is, nevertheless, quite different.
Like most reinforcement learning algorithms, the framework of
Dyna-style planning is much more computational than our
approach. It uses world models for planning and to decide the course
of action. Such planning involvesa non-trivial computational process
(Dyna-algorithm for policy evaluation) the result of which is then
used by the agent to find the optimum course of action. Projective
simulation, as mentioned before, is much more primitive; it only
involves random hopping through a set of clips, without any further
computation. The only parameters that need to be changed and
updated in the clip network are the weights of the clip transitions,
similar as neural networks (however with the difference that new
clips may be created). In that sense, projective simulation is much
more embodied and should rather be compared with a biological
stochastic process than with the result of planning and computation.
Despite their conceptual differences, on simple tasks like the inva-
sion game, these different learning models show similar features. In
Figure18,wecomparetheperformanceofthelearningmodelsinthe
invasion game with two symbols and two actions, jSj 5 jAj 5 2,
where the attacker changes the meaning of the symbols at n 5 150.
We compare learning curves of (a) projective simulation, using mul-
tiple reflections (reflection number R), with (b) experience replay
(replay number N), and (c) Dyna-style planning (planning number
p), where the latter two models were based on the Q-learning algo-
rithm
1,29. Increasing the parameters R, N, and p leads to an increased
learning speed in each of the respective models, with similar per-
formance.However,differentfromexperiencereplayandDyna-style
Figure 18 | Comparisonofprojectivesimulationwithexperiencereplay
15
and Dyna-style planning
19. Learning curves are shown for (a) projective
simulation (reflection number R) with c 5 1/10 and l 5 1, (b) experience
replay (replay number N), (c) Dyna-style planning (planning number p),
whereby both (b) and (c) use the tabular Q-learning algorithm
1 with a
softmax action selection rule, based on the Boltzmann distribution. For
both(b)and (c)the Qfunction wasinitialized to1,andareward of1.5856
was used together with a learning-rate parameter of a 5 0.4. The
parameters were chosen such that for R 5 1, N 5 1, p 5 0, the initial
learning speed and the asymptotic value of the respective learning curves
are similar. In (c) the imagined state and action were picked randomly out
ofallpossiblestatesandactions.ItisseenthatincreasingtheparametersR,
N, and p leads to an increased learning speed in each of the respective
models, with similar performance. However, different from experience
replay and Dyna-style planning, projective simulation with multiple
reflection increases not only the learning speed but at the same time the
maximumachievablevalueofthelearningparameter(blockingefficiency).
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notonlythelearningspeedbutalsothemaximumachievablevalueof
the blocking efficiency. The latter can also be achieved in (b) and (c)
by changing the external reward.
Generally speaking, we find that on simple tasks like the invasion
game the performance of projective simulation is certainly compet-
itive with other modern reinforcement learning algorithms such as
experience replay
15or Dyna-style planning
19. For morecomplex task
environmentsthesedifferentmodelsmayperformdifferentlywellon
different aspects. With increasing dimension of percept and action
space, we find a linear scaling of the learning time with jSj and jAj,
respectively, similar as for Q-learning
35. For problems that require
long-term planning, we expect methods based on Q-learning or
adaptive heuristic critique
1 to be more favorable, whereas projective
simulation with the possibility of clip composition should be favor-
able in problems where ‘‘creative’’ action in a given situation is in
demand. A combination of ideas from projective simulation, such as
the use of internal flags encoding short-time memory, with estab-
lishedalgorithmsforlong-timeplanningispartofanongoinginvest-
igation
35.
Quantum projective simulation. We now address the generali-
zation of projective simulation to quantum mechanical operation.
Themotivationofthisquestionistwofold.Onereasonistheongoing
miniaturization of devices down to the scale of nano-technologies. It
isconceivablethatsoonrobotswillbeusedtocontrolmatterevenon
the molecular andatomic scale, beitin basic research laboratories or
in medical applications inside the human body. Agent research will
then have to deal with issues of quantum feedback and control
37 and
its future applications.
Another, more direct, reason has to do with the computational
capabilities of quantum computers. It was found that computers
which operate on quantum mechanical principles can solve certain
mathematical tasks much more efficiently than any classical com-
puter
5. It is thus natural to ask whether a similar benefit can be
expected for models of artificial intelligence when the architecture
of agents involves quantum mechanics. If one defines an intelligent
agent or robot simply as some machine with a ‘‘computer on board’’
and with sensors & actuators as ‘‘input-output devices’’, then the
answer seems to be straightforward: Replace the classical computer
with a quantum computer, run the right quantum algorithm on it,
and thus obtain a more efficient agent. The question is then, of
course, what is the right quantum algorithm. A more fundamental
problem with this approach is that such a computational viewpoint
might miss essential aspects of intelligent behavior from the begin-
ning. It seems that neither a classical computer nor a quantum com-
puter per se will make the agent intelligent, nor will any fixed
algorithm that runs on these devices. As it has been emphasized in
recent literature on artificial intelligence
3,6, the emergence of intel-
ligent behavior seems to require continuous feedback between the
agent and its environment at its very heart: In modern terminology,
the agent needs to be embodied and situated in an environment it
interacts with
3. Modern notions of (reinforcement) learning and
agents are developed within this framework, and so is our approach
to creative behavior, in which the network of clips i.e. the episodic
memory grows as the agent interacts with the world. Furthermore,
theevolutionoftheepisodicmemory(clipnetwork)istherebyfirmly
embedded in the agent architecture.
In the following we describe how the model of projective simu-
lation can be generalized in the quantum regime, introducing a
notion ofquantum agents. Inquantum mechanics, states of asystem
are described by vectors (or rays) in a complex Hilbert space, and
observables by linear Hermitean operators acting on that space. A
quantum-enhanced autonomous agent can be defined as an agent
that interacts with a classical environment, but whose memory, (or,
more generally, internal state) uses quantum degrees of freedom.
(There are also other situations conceivable where the environment
is quantum mechanical, which will however not be considered
here
38). In the notation and terminology we have used so far, the
external variables s (percepts) and a (actions) are then still classical
variables, while the clips c g C become quantum states jcæ g HC
(Hilbert space of the memory). An external stimulus s will excite
memory in a quantum state jcæ 5 jq s æ (the percept clip) which has
now the status of a basis state in the memory system. The random
walkinclipspace,whichisanessentialingredientinourmodel,now
becomes a quantum walk in the associated Hilbert space of the
(quantum) memory, with the replacements
pc 0jc ðÞ ? c0jc hi jj
2 ð16Þ
for elementary transitions between clips, and
pc 00jc ðÞ ?
X
c0
c00jc0 hi c0 jj c hi
         
         
2
: ð17Þ
for composite transitions. Here the scalar product Æc9jcæ defines the
probability amplitude for the transition q c R , and the modulus
squared in the expression for the composite transition gives rise to
quantum interference, which is one of the basic features of quantum
mechanics. Quantum interference is in particular exploited in fast
algorithms for quantum search
39 and quantum walks on graphs
40.
Let us now describe the quantization procedure in more detail.
With the clip network as illustrated in Figure 2 one can associate a
graph G 5 (V, E), where the vertices j g V label the different clips
cj g C within the network and the edges {j, k} g E denote possible
transitions between clips. A quantum walk in memory space is then
generated by a Hamiltonian of the form
41
H~
X
j,k fg [E
ljk ^ c
{
k^ cjz^ ck^ c
{
j
  
z
X
j[V
j^ c
{
j^ cj
~
X
j,k fg [E
ljk ck ji cj
     z cj
     
ck hj
  
z
X
j[V
j cj
     
cj
     
ð18Þ
where the operator^ cj excites the memory from its ground state into
clip cj,
cj
     
~^ c
{
j vac ji ð19Þ
and^ c
{
k^ cj induces a transition cj R ck:
^ c
{
k^ cj cj
     
~ ck ji : ð20Þ
The dynamical equation that describes the coherent quantum
walk is given by the Liouville-von Neumann equation
L
Lt
r~{iH ,r ½  ð 21Þ
where r 5 r(t) is the quantum state (density operator) of the mem-
ory at time t,[ H, r] ; Hr 2 rH is the commutator, and we have set
Planck’s constant to unity.
The (real) coupling parameters ljk in (18) induce coherent transi-
tionsbetweenthedifferentclipsinthenetwork.Onecanalsoinclude
further,incoherent,transitionsdescribedbyaLiouvilleanoperatorof
the type
Lr~
X
j,k fg [E
kjk ^ c
{
k^ cjr^ ck^ c
{
j {
1
2
^ c
{
k^ cj^ ck^ c
{
j rzr^ c
{
k^ cj^ ck^ c
{
j
no   
ð22Þ
with kjk$0, in which case (21) generalizes to the quantum master
equation
L
Lt
r~{iH ,r ½  zLr: ð23Þ
The dynamical equation (23) represents a generalization to the
master equation/stochastic process that describes the classical ran-
domwalk,whichisformallyrecoveredinthelimitwhereH50.The
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rise to quantum superpositions and interference, which lies at the
heart of the quantum parallelism that is exploited in quantum com-
puters and in quantum walks. The incoherent transition generated
by the Lindblad part can be interpreted as the result of spontaneous
‘‘quantum jumps’’ between different clip states.
Most examples of quantum walks that have been studied corre-
spond to walks on undirected graphs. A possibility to introduce
directed walks is to add incoherent transitions generated by (22).
The price one has to pay with such directed transition is that they
introduce decoherence, so in general there will be a balance between
quantum coherence on one side, and directedness on the other side.
Incombiningtheseelements,onecandesignwalkswithcoherent,bi-
directional transitions in certain regions of the network (or graph),
combinedwithincoherenttransitionsthat‘‘project’’tootherregions,
or that exit the clip network. The Hamiltonian used in (18) can be
generalized to so-called composite walks
41 that include further
degrees of freedom associated with a given transition, which could
beusedtoincludetheemotiontagsintothequantummode,aswellas
to implement discrete quantum walks using quantum coins
42.
The clips themselves have a composite structure and may include
remembered percepts s g S or actions a g A, each of which can be
composed of different categories. This compositional structure is
accounted for by a tensor-product in the Hilbert space of the clips.
Forexample,incaseofaperceptclipc5m(s),thecorrespondingclip
operators have the form
^ c{~^ m{ s ðÞ ~^ m
{
1 s1 ðÞ 6^ m
{
2 s2 ðÞ ...^ m
{
N sN ðÞ ð 24Þ
where ^ m
{
i is the memory operator that excites percept of category i
(like, for example, color or shape).
A call of episodic memory in this picture involves three steps,
which also illustrates the embedding of the quantum walk into the
otherwise classical agent architecture:
N Memoryactivation.ClassicalperceptsgStriggerstheexcitation
of an associated memory state: s.r s ðÞ ~ y s ðÞ ji y s ðÞ hj . (In the
simplest case, y s ðÞ ji ~ s ji ~^ m{ s ðÞvac ji , but jy(s)æ could also
involve superpositions of several percept states related to s.)
N Quantum walk through the network of clips, as described by the
quantum master equation (23) with Hamiltonian (18) and with
jy(s)æ as initial state.
N Memory output. A classical signal that induces (real) action is
generated by the measurement of certain memory observables.
(In the examples given so far, these are the actuator observables
m
^{(a)m
^(a),andtheprobability pt(a)foranactuatormotionatobe
triggered at time t is given by pt(a) 5 tr(m
^{(a)m
^(a)r(t)) 5
tr(m
^(a)r(t)m
^{(a)) where r(t) is the state of the memory at time t.)
This described model represents a generalization of the classical
random walk, which can be recovered from (23) by switching off the
coherent interactions. It is clear that the possibility of creating
quantum superpositions of many different percept states opens the
door for potentially huge speed-ups in exploring memory
42, which is
subject of an ongoing investigation
35. Note that quantum ran-
dom walk processes similar to (23), with engineered quantum
many-bodyinteractions,haverecentlybeenrealizedinthecontextof
dissipation-driven quantum simulation with trapped ions
43.
Similarly, quantum simulators based on laser-driven atomic gases
in optical lattices have been proposed
44,45 and are currently being
explored in many laboratories.
The scheme that we have presented can be extended into various
ways. Instead of a simple quantum walk, one can also introduce
additional quantum computational elements when calling and pro-
cessing episodes in memory space. A more detailed exposition of
these ideas is beyond the scope of this paper and will be given in
future work
38.
Discussion
We have introduced the notion of projective simulation and dis-
cussed its potential role for learning in artificial agents. We have
shownthatitallowsanagenttoprojectitselfintofictitioussituations,
which are self-generated by the agent (and its specific memory sys-
tem) and which influence its future actions. Projective simulation
enhances the learning capabilities of an agent and introduces an
elementary notionof creativeaction. Toillustrate thebasic concepts,
we have worked out simple but concrete examples of learning agents
and the interplay of simulation and episodic memory (ECM). We
have programmed a learning agent that uses projective simulation,
studied itsbehavior andtested itsperformance in the invasion game.
The idea of projective simulation is however more general and we
believe that the scheme, as part of a comprehensive embodied
approach to artificial intelligence, could be implemented in auto-
nomous agents or robots with realistic task environments.
We believe that the ‘‘embodied approach’’ to artificial intelligence
parallelsinsomewaytherecentstrongattentiontotheroleofphysics
for the foundations of computer science (down to the level of
quantum mechanics). In a similar spirit as people have studied the
ultimate power of computers on the basis of physical law
46,47, we are
here concerned with the question of the ultimate scope of intelligent
behavior in embodied agents, taking into account the physical basis
of this embodiment. To approach this question, one first needs to
develop a model of simulation in agents that is both physically
grounded and at the same time general in its constitutive concepts
(i.e.notlinkedtoaspecificimplementation).Wehaveshownthatthe
abstractnotionofclipsandofprojectivesimulationasarandomwalk
through the space of clips, which grows dynamically by the specified
rules of clip variation and composition, provides a first step towards
such a general framework. From a physicist’s perspective, such a
random walk can be understood as the propagation of excitations
of physical degrees of freedom that represent the information car-
rying quantities. Within such conceptual framework, we can for-
mulate, for the first time, a meaningful notion of an embodied
quantum agent, by extending the model of projective simulation to
the quantum regime.
Methods
Within an approximate analytical treatment, one can give a closed recursion relation
forthemeanentriesoftheh-matrix.Weconsider thegeneralcaseofjSjdifferent per-
cepts and jAj different actions, where for each percept there is a single rewarded ac-
tion. For simplicity, we assume a regular training scenario, P
(n)(s) 5 d(s 2 n mod jSj)
such that, within a subsequence of jSj cycles, each percept is excited exactly once and
in the same order. For such a scenario, onecanderivefrom (6) a recursion relation of
the form
  h nz S jj ðÞ s,a ðÞ {1^ 1{c ðÞ
S jj   h n ðÞs,a ðÞ {1
  
z 1{c ðÞ
S jj {1l
  hs ,a ðÞ
P
a0[A   hs ,a0 ðÞ
ð25Þ
for rewarded transitions, and a similar expression, without the gain term (i.e. l 5 0),
for the unrewarded transitions. Here,   h n ðÞs,a ðÞ denotes the averaged weight for a re-
wardedtransitionq s Rq a,takenoveranensemble ofdifferent runs. Equation (25)is
not exact and in general contains an overestimation of the gain term, but for small
values of c it gives a rather good approximation to the numerical results
35. Thesteady
-stateconditionreads  h nz S jj ðÞ s,a ðÞ ~  h n ðÞs,a ðÞ :  hs ,a ðÞ ,whereby   hs ,a’ ðÞ ~1forallun-
rewarded transitions. This leads to quadratic equations of the form
  hs ,a ðÞ {1~ 1{c ðÞ
S jj   hs ,a ðÞ {1
  
z 1{c ðÞ
S jj {1l
  hs ,a ðÞ
  hs ,a ðÞ z A jj {1
,
ð26Þ
that can be solved analytically, providing an approximate value for the steady-state
blocking efficiency   r^
  h
  hz A jj {1
shown in Figure 8. (For 5 0, one obtains from
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2 : 400 | DOI: 10.1038/srep00400 15(26) the trivial steady-state value   hs ,a ðÞ ~1, recovering the value   r~0:5 for random
action). Similarly, based on (25), one can derive an approximate analytic expression
for the initial slope of the learning curve
D  r
Dn
  
n~1
~
l 1{c ðÞ
S jj {1 A jj {1 ðÞ
A jj
3 S jj {1z S jj =2 ðÞ
: ð27Þ
Equations(25)and(26)providetheanalyticapproximationstothelearningcurvesin
shown in Figure 8.
1. Sutton,RichardS.&Barto,AndrewG.Reinforcement learning.Firstedition(MIT
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1998).
2. Russel, Stuart J. & Norvig, Peter. Artifical intelligence - A modern approach.
Second edition (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2003).
3. Pfeiffer, Rolf & Scheier, Christian. Understanding intelligence. First edition (MIT
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1999).
4. Briegel,HansJ.Onmachinecreativityandthenotionoffreewill.arXiv:1105.1759
(2011).
5. Nielsen, M. A.&Chuang, I. L.Quantumcomputationandquantuminformation,
First edition. (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000).
6. Floreano, Dario & Mattiussi, Claudio. Bio-inspired artificial intelligence : theories,
methods, and technologies. First edition (MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts,
2008).
7. Tulving, Endel. Episodic and semantic memory. In Organization of Memory, ed.
Tulving,E.,Donaldson,W.,pp.2381–403(1972).ForarecentreviewseeTulving,
Endel, Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 53, 1–25
(2002).
8. Ingvar, D. H. ‘‘Memory of the future’’: An essay on the temporal organization of
conscious awareness. Human neurobiology 4, 127–136 (1985).
9. Tolman, Edward C. Cognitive maps in rats and men. The Psychological Review
55(4), 189–208 (1948).
10. Piaget, Jean. Mental imagery in the child: a study of the development of imaginal
representation. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).
11. Clark, Andy & Grush, Rick. Towards a Cognitive Robotics. Adaptive Behavior 7,
5–16 (1999).
12. Hesslow, Germund. Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and
perception. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 6, 242–247 (2002).
13.Schacter, Daniel L., Addis, Donna Rose &Buckner, Randy L.Episodic Simulation
of Future Events: Concepts, Data, and Applications. Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci. 1124,
3960 (2008).
14. Hasselmo, Michael E. How we remember. Brain mechanisms of episodic memory.
First edition (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2011).
15. Lin, Long-Ji. Self-improving reactive agents based on reinforcement learning,
planning and teaching. Machine Learning 8, 292–321 (1992).
16.Sutton,R.S.Integratedarchitecturesforlearning,planning,andreactingbasedon
approximating dynamic programming. Proceedings of the Seventh International
Conference on Machine Learning ICML90, Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 216–224
(1990).
17.Sutton,R.S.,Precup, D., Singh, S.BetweenMDPsandsemi-MDPs: AFramework
for Temporal Abstraction in Reinforcement Learning. Artificial Intelligence 112,
181–211 (1999).
18. Ormoneit, D. & Sen, S. Kernel-based reinforcement learning. Machine Learning
49, 161178 (2002)
19. Sutton, R. S., Szepesvari, Cs., Geramifard, A. & Bowling, M. Dyna-style planning
with linear function approximation and prioritized sweeping. Proceedings of the
24th Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, pp. 528–536 (2008).
20. McCallum, R. Andrew, Instance-Based Utile Distinctions for Reinforcement
Learning with Hidden State. Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference
on Machine Learning, Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 387–395 (1995).
21.Parr,R.&Russell,S.ReinforcementLearningwithHierarchiesofMachines.NIPS
10, 1043–1049 (1998).
22. Dietterich, T. G. Hierarchical reinforcement learning with the MAXQ value
function decomposition. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 13, 227–303
(2000).
23. Tani, Jun. Model-Based Learning for Mobile Robot Navigation from the
Dynamical Systems Perspective. IEEE Trans. System, Man and Cybernetics 26,
421–436 (1996).
24.Hoffman,H.&Mo ¨ller,R.ActionSelectionandMentalTransformationBasedona
Chain of Forward Models. In Schaal et al (eds.) Proceedings of the 8th Conference
on Simulation of Adaptive Behavior (SAB ’04), pp. 213–222, MIT Press
(2004).
25.Vaughan,R.&Zuluaga,M.Useyourillusion:SensorimotorSelf-simulationallows
complex agents to plan with incomplete self-knowledge. In: Nolfi et al (eds.) SAB
2006, LNCS (LNAI) 4095, 298–309, Springer (2006).
26. Toussaint, M. A sensorimotor map: Modulating lateral interactions for
anticipation and planning. Neural Computation 18, 1132–1155 (2006).
27. Butz, Martin V., Shirinov, Elshad & Reif, Kevin L. Self-Organizing Sensorimotor
Maps Plus Internal Motivations Yield Animal-Like Behavior. Adaptive Behavior
18, 315–337 (2010).
28. Holland, John H. Adaptation in natural and artificial systems: an introductory
analysiswithapplicationstobiology,control,andartificialintelligence.(University
of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 1975).
29. Watkins, C. J. C. H. Learning from delayed rewards. PhD Thesis, University of
Cambridge, England, 1989.
30. Braitenberg, Valentino. Vehicles: Experiments in synthetic psychology. First
paperback edition (MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1986).
31. Kandel, Eric. The molecular biology of memory storage: A dialog between genes
and synapses. in ‘‘Nobel Lectures, Physiology or Medicine 1996–2000,’’ Editor
Hans Jrnvall (World Scientific Publishing Co., Singapore, 2003).
32. Antonov Igor, Antonova Irina, Kandel Eric R. & Hawkins Robert D. Activity-
dependent presynaptic facilitation and Hebbian LTP are both required and
interact during classical conditioning in Aplysia. Neuron 37 (1), 135147 (2003).
33. Heisenberg Martin. et al Attracting a fly’s attention. Invited Talk at the ESF-
EMBO Conference Functional Neurobiology in Minibrains: From Flies to Robots
and Back Again, 17–22 October 2010, Sant Feliu de Guixols, Spain.
34.Sareen, PreetiS., Wolf Reinhard &HeisenbergMartin.Attracting the attention of
a fly. PNAS 108, 7230–7235 (2011).
35. Mautner, J., Makmal, A. et al. unpublished manuscript (2012).
36. Godsil Chris & Royle Gordon. Algebraic Graph Theory. First edition (Springer,
New York, 2001).
37. Wiseman, H. M. & Milburn, G. J. Quantum Measurement and Control.
(Cambridge University Press, 2009).
38. Briegel, H. J. Projective simulation for artificial intelligence. Invited talk delivered
at 6th conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and
Cryprography (TQC 2011), Madrid, Spain, 24–26 May 2011.
39. Grover Lev. Quantum Mechanics helps in searching for a needle in a haystack.
Physical Review Letters 79, 325–328 (1997).
40. Aharonov Dorit, Ambainis Andris, Kempe Julia & Vazirani Umesh. Quantum
Walks On Graphs. Proceedings of ACM Symposium on Theory of Computation
(STOC’01), July 2001, pp. 50–59.
41. Hines, A. P. & Stamp, P. C. E. Quantum walks, quantum gates, and quantum
computers. Physical Review A 75, 062321 (2007).
42. Kempe Julia. Quantum random walks - an introductory overview. Contemporary
Physics 44, 307327 (2003).
43.Barreiro,J.T.etal.Anopen-systemquantumsimulatorwithtrappedions.Nature
470, 486–491 (2011).
44.WeimerHendrik. etal.ARydbergquantumsimulator.NaturePhysics6,382–388
(2010).
45. Diehl Sebastian. et al.Quantum states and phases in driven open quatum systems
with cold atoms. Nature Physics 4, 878–883 (2008).
46. Feynman Richard. Simulating physics with computers. Int. J. Theor. Phys. 21,
467–488 (1982).
47.DeutschDavid.QuantumTheory,theChurch-TuringPrincipleandtheUniversal
Quantum Computer. Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 400, 97–117 (1985).
Acknowledgements
We thank Julian Mautner, Adi Makmal, and Daniel Manzano for discussions and for
leaving us part of their numerical results prior to publication. The work was supported by
the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) through projects F04011 and F04012.
Author contributions
H.J.B. and G.D.L.C. designed the research. G.D.L.C. performed the numerical simulations.
H.J.B. wrote the manuscript.
Additional information
Competing financial interests: The authors declare no competing financial interests.
License: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivative Works 3.0 Unported License. To view a copy
of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/
How to cite this article: Briegel, H.J. & De las Cuevas, G. Projective simulation for artificial
intelligence. Sci. Rep. 2, 400; DOI:10.1038/srep00400 (2012).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2 : 400 | DOI: 10.1038/srep00400 16